Induction

[W]e must act according to the rule of induction even if we cannot believe in it….  We do not know whether tomorrow the order of the world will not come to an end… or at least our own world may come to an end, because we may close our eyes forever.  Tomorrow is unknown to us but this fact need not make any differences in our considerations determining our actions….

A blind man who has lost his way in the mountains feels a trail with his stick.  He does not know where the path will lead him, or whether it may take him so close to the edge of a precipice that he will be plunged into the abyss.  Yet he follows the path, groping his way step by step; for if there is any possibility of getting out of the wilderness, it is by feeling his way along the path.  As blind men we face the future; but we feel a path.  And we know: if we can find a way through the future it is by feeling our way long this path.

(Reichenbach 1949, 482)
Reichenbach, Hans. 1949. The Theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical Foundations of the Calculus of Probability. Berkeley: University of California.


Regardless of whether there is “an a priori  reason why the conclusion of a standard inductive argument is likely to be true…. [a] chaotic world, though perfectly possible prior to the consideration of empirical evidence, is rendered extremely unlikely… by the occurrence of standard inductive evidence… and… it is an a priori fact that this is so… [since] anything less than this will not really explain why the inductive evidence occurred in the first place” (BonJour 1998, 213-214)
BonJour, Laurence. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason: a Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University.