Incorporating Others' Insights in Debates

From: Lekan, Todd. 2003. Making Morality: Pragmatist Reconstruction in Ethical Theory. Vanderbilt University Press.

The… focus on general principles frequently takes people away from careful and intelligent inspection of particular facts of the problem… [and] a focus on general principles tends to foster an attitude of moral righteousness…. In short, if we are too quick to frame moral disagreement in terms of general moral principles, we are apt to be too quick to frame the moral problem as a decision problem – as a problem with those who are either too stupid, selfish, or evil to see their own moral sins.

In… good moral argument (p.115)… when we… provide justifications for action plans, we typically refer to “data” or “facts of the case,” which we take to ground some conclusion…. “Why did you leave work early today?” “Because my child was ill and needed to be picked up early from day care.”… Of course these bare statements do not tell us much. This is because usually the context in which grounds are provided is implicitly understood by all concerned. (p.116) … Such practical arguments do not guarantee that their conclusions follow “necessarily” from their premises. The strength of the conclusion is a matter… depending on the weight of the grounds and warrant offered.(p.117)… Sometimes the problem is merely that of whether D[ata] holds true. Was he really sick?… Sometimes the dispute is over the force of the conclusion in light of rebutting circumstances: “Sure, typically a sick child would be grounds for letting you off work early. However, you could have stayed fifteen minutes longer, couldn’t you? Given the importance of finishing this project and getting it in the mail today, it seems under these circumstances you shouldn’t have left early.” (p.118) …

But… how do we resolve disagreements about warrants when these disagreements are based in divergent interpretive horizons – divergent ideals and “fundamental values” – different “backings”?… (p.122) On the one hand, we should not exaggerate the amount of conflict and incommensurability at stake…. Furthermore, we may assume that at least some of the dispute can in principle be settled by more factual inquiry…. Moreover, the “backings” used to “establish” these warrants are complex conceptions that do not deductively “entail” a certain warrant but rather makes plausible differing sorts of warrants. (p.124)…. Thirdly…if people realize that in some instances conflict over norms or warrants is the result of differing “warrant-establishing interpretive standpoints,” then they will be more likely to work toward mutual understanding in these areas of dispute… assuming that [they]… are willing to accept the claim that moral norms can really become problematic, and therefore that particular moral judgments are fallible. (p.125)