General Statements that the Ethical Takes Precedence over the Holy
In the course of explaining hukkim, we have seen that Torah
culture is defined by its goal of Goodness and its pursuit of holiness and
dignity in order to serve that goal, not to supersede that goal. In the words of Maimonides:
Cleaning garments, washing the body, and removal of dirt also
constitute one of the purposes of this Law.
But this comes after the purifications of the actions and the
purification of the heart from polluting opinions and polluting moral qualities
(Guide 3:33, trans. Pines). [1]
Similarly, Maimonides explained that the reason that critical religious
practices do not take precedence over human life is because the laws of Torah
are intended to bring mercy, kindness, and peace to the world (Laws of Shabbat
2:3). In the simple words of R. Juda
Loeb (MaHaRa”L mi-Prague, d.1609) avoiding disgusting behavior is holy behavior
(Gur Arye, Leviticus 20:8) but avoiding evil yet alluring behavior is even
holier behavior (Gur Arye, Exodus 22:32).
In the even simpler words of the tanna, R. Pinhas b. Yair (2nd
century CE), the process of character development merely begins with personal
cleanliness (m. Sota 9:15).
The greatest twentieth century analytical scholar of Jewish Law, R.
Shimon Shkop (Poland and Belarus, 1860-1940), stated the primacy of the ethical
demand most forcefully. He argued (in
his introduction to Sha’arei Yosher) that the Levitical demand to imitate God
and be holy (Leviticus 19:1-2) is actually a demand to dedicate all of one’s
actions to the public welfare - including those personal selfish actions that
one must perform in order to allow herself to function well and to thus serve
the public successfully.[2] R. Shkop argued that this is
the only way we can truly imitate God in His holiness; mere asceticism, merely
refraining from the pleasures of life, is not truly imitatio Dei
inasmuch as the Eternal has no desires from which He refrains. Although R. Shkop’s read of holiness may sound
modernist (cf. Rynhold and Harris 2008, 260-269), it actually fits well with
the fact that the short Code of Leviticus to which he refers (Leviticus
19:1-37)[3] opens with a demand to be holy, and closes each of its ethical
directives with the words “I am the
Eternal”.[4]
R. Shkop’s reading redirects our attention to
the fact that according to this Biblical Code, other legal and prophetic
sections of Tanakh, and leading Jewish sages through the ages, the point of all
these norms is for humans to connect to God in their ethical behavior. As we have seen repeatedly in these
chapters, the Jewish tradition has been understood to call upon humans to act
Go[o]dly and experience Go[o]dliness as individuals and a people. It is because this behavior and experience
is lost or challenged to varying degrees when individuals commit the unethical,
perform the disgusting, or experience the unsettling[5] that such actions are forbidden or curtailed.
CONCLUSION
This understanding that there is a general Biblical proscription or
meta-proscription against disgusting behavior led Amoraim to weigh actions by
their degree of contemporary repugnance instead of by their formal
classifications as Biblical prescriptions.[6] For example, the Amoraim all
agreed that one is permitted to avoid performing a Biblical commandment or to
commit a Rabbinic sin in order to preserve personal dignity; the Amoraim only
debated whether one may also commit a Biblical sin in order to preserve
personal dignity (R. Zeira in y. Nazir 7:1; anonymous debate in y. Kilayim 9:1;
Rav and Rav bar Sheva in b. Berakhot 19b).[7] In fact, one could argue – as did the
renowned Hungarian Torah scholar, R. Moshe Shmuel Glasner (1856-1924)[8]
– that as regards a person who faces not mere indignity but rather severe
shame, all Amoraim would agree that avoiding shameful behavior overrides
Biblical religious sins.
[1] In
greater elaboration: “When only the desires are followed, as is done by the
ignorant… cares and sorrows multiply, mutual envy, hatred, and strife aiming at
taking away what the other has, multiply.
All this comes about because the ignoramus regards pleasure alone as the
end to be sought for its own sake.
Therefore God, may His name be held sublime… forbids everything that
leads to lusts and mere pleasure. This
is an important purpose of the Law.
Similarly one of the intentions of the Law is purity and sanctification;
I mean by this renouncing and avoiding sexual intercourse and causing it to be
as infrequent as possible. …And just as the Law designates obedience to these
commandments as sanctity and purity, it also designates
transgression of these commandments and the perpetration of evil actions as impurity.”
(Guide of the Perplexed [trans. Pines], 3:33)
[2] On the role of acknowledging the validity of humans partially meeting
their selfish needs (until they overcome them) see: “To shove our impulses
underground by the taboo is to force them to virulent and uncontrolled
expression. To follow impulse wherever it leads means the satisfaction of one
impulse at the expense of all the others. The glutton and the rake can satisfy
only their gluttonous and rakish impulses, and that isn't enough for happiness.
What civilized men aim at is neither whim nor taboo, but a frank recognition of
desire, disciplined by a knowledge of what is possible, and ordered by the
conscious purpose of their lives.” (Lippmann 1914)
[3] This miniature code has been recognized as a code
and commented upon by various Geonim and Rishonim including Rav Saadya Gaon and
Ramban. For further discussion of its
literary contours, see critical Biblical scholarship on the Holiness Code such
as Paton 1897 and Krumrei 1985.
[4] This point was already noted by the Tannaim (Sifra
Kedoshim, beginning of parsha 2; Sifra Bahar 3:4; baraita b. Kiddushin 32b).
[5] The only explanation I can offer for the poor
scholarship preceding this chapter’s psychological definition of tum’a is
that “dMiller 1997,
[6] See Yere’im #73; Rabbeinu Yona’s Shaarei Teshuva 3:93; Novella of Ritva
Makkot 16b; and Beit Yosef YD 116.
[8] Dor Revi’I al Masekhet
Hullin, introduction #2.
[Unfortunately the critical
quote for this point is not translated in Elman 1991, 63-69.]
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