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Monday, April 23, 2012

The Avoidance of Negative Experiences

(First Post)


Clean Hands versus Dirty Hands
In my future book, I discuss the Biblical and rabbinic desire to control or even avoid negative experiences -- to avoid impurity.  In this post, instead of reviewing all the halakhot of purity and impurity, we will turn to discuss the lowest level of rabbinic impurity, the impurity of hands.  Famously, the Pharisees[1] and later the Tannaim, expected civilized people to clean their hands before eating (m. Hagiga 2:5).  Tannaitically that meant to wash the hands twice in order to remove dirty material found on the hands and to wipe them afterward in order to completely clean them of the dirt and dirty water left on one’s hands (m. Yadayim 2:2-3 and t. Yadayim 1:3).
Since the issue is cleanliness, some Tannaim allowed one who eats a small item to place it in a cloth (m. Sukka 2:5).  That way not only will one’s dirty hands not touch the food (cf. baraita of Beit Menashe in b. Yoma 77b=Hullin 107b) but one’s unwashed hands and food will also not become moistly dirty, “muddy” (as we will discuss shortly).  Similarly, since many poorer peoples in the Hellenist world did not waste their fetched and drawn water on washing hands before eating, the Tannaim did not demand that every Jew wash hands for every-day food (m. Bikkurim 2:1 and more explicit Bavli parallel).  In fact, some Babylonian Amoraim even opposed the haughtiness of washing hands for mere snacks (R. Nahman in b. Hagiga 18b).  As an Israeli Amora expressed it, it is only the snack that is eaten wet that requires clean hands (R. Eleazar in the name of R. Oshaya in b. Pesahim 115a) – presumably in order to avoid having the food get “muddy”.
Similarly to the Tannaim and Amoraim, Medieval German Judaism mandated that people wash their hands not only from contact with objects and events associated with death and mortality but also from dirt.  Its rabbis even posited that one who doesn’t regulate his behavior to be clean finally forgets the Torah he has learned and can lose his sanity or self-control, presumably due to his loss of self-dignity or even fall into nihilism (Mahzor Vitry #524; Tashbetz Katan #276).[2]  This claim persisted.[3]
In short: an examination of both the most severe and most lenient types of impurity show that they are negative emotional states which the Biblical and rabbinic norms try to avoid or at least address, that there is a general Biblical proscription or meta-proscription against disgusting behavior.  As the tanna, R. Pinhas b. Yair, stated: the process of character development begins with personal cleanliness (m. Sota 9:15).

The Framing of Biological Needs
This approach, which calls for behaving in a self-controlled fashion as regards cleanliness, self-dignity and human death - extends into the biological activities that humans share with animals: ingestion, expurgation and copulation.  Thus, the sages also called for eating with manners.  At the very least, Tannaim expected all Jews to minimally sanctify their food consumption by not simply grabbing the food and eating it, by first blessing God.  One who ate without pausing to bless was denigrated as having abused Temple property; the earth and its goodness were to be perceived as holy property that one is expected to use in holiness (t. Berakhot 4:1).  Beyond that, there is a tradition that R. Akiva directed his students to politely tear off their part of the vegetable with one hand and to hold the part that is left behind in place with the mere heel of their hand instead of their whole hand when eating a vegetable from a common dish (Tractate Derekh Eretz, Pirkei Ben Azzai 5:2 ??check alternative versions??).[4]  Similarly, Eretz-Israel sages directed a person both to not hold too large a piece of food in his hands from which he continuously chews and to not drink too much too quickly (Tractate Derekh Eretz, Pirkei Ben Azzai 4:5).[5]  In a further step, the Israeli Amora R. Isaac (3rd century CE) used to dignify the cultural norm of eating with one’s hands.  He would indicate with his clean fingers the ten mitzvoth that had been fulfilled in preparing the food before he ate with his hands (y. Hala 1:6).[6]
In parallel to these rules of consumption, there are also Talmudic rules about how one should expurgate and how one should copulate.  As regards expurgation, one is expected to attend to personal bodily functions while partially clothed as opposed to as a naked animal releasing its droppings, [7] and R. Tanhum b. Hanilai did in fact exhort to such modesty by pointing out its practical benefits (b. Berakhot 62a).  As regards copulation, Leviticus limits excessive priestly indulgence in sex by impurifying for a whole day the couple that had sex at night (Leviticus 15:16,18);[8] the Israeli Amora, R. Yohanan, declared sex during the daytime – when one can be productive – to be degrading (Bereishit Rabba 64:8); and several Amoraim called upon fellow sages to limit sex to once per week, to the Friday night of rest (b. Ketubot 62a = b. Bava Kamma 82a) when the man should indeed consume an aphrodisiac (y. Megilla 4:1; b. Bava Kamma 82a).[9]  In conjunction, the Amora R. Dimmi (b. Bekhorot 8a) called for sex to be framed as a human relational act by being engaged in face to face as an act between fellow humans who have contact with the Divine.  Face to face is clearly more respectful [especially on a regular basis].[10]


[1] Mark 7:1-23 = Matthew 15:1-20.
[2] Although we have explained Ashkenazic practices, Maimonides unknowingly condemned some of them as Sabian foolishness in Guide of the Perplexed 3:47.  As he explained there: Although the purpose of such rules is “to keep men away from disgusting things”, these rules should not include “unpleasant restrictions” and “burdensome usages”.  Nonetheless, Maimonides’ son, R. Abraham b. Rambam (Sefer Ha-Maspik Le-Ovdei Hashem, Trait of Humility [p.70]), stated independently but in agreement with his contemporary twelfth century sage, the French‑German R. Eliezer from Metz (Sefer Yere’im #434), that although expensive clothing makes a person haughty being dirty or disgusting degrades and impurifies a person.
[3] It made its way to the Land of Israel and to the Jews exiled from Spain (BY citing his teacher ?? in my source sheets).  It was repeated in the offshoots of Ashkenazic Jewry by diverse rabbinic figures, including the Hasidic R. Nahman of Bretzlav, 1772-1810 (Likutei MoHaRa”N #29; Likutei Halakhot, Tzitzit #1; Sikhot ha-Ra”N #100).
[4] For a less strict version, which merely forbids biting out one’s portion from the shared dish, see the citation in Mishna Berura 170:25.
[5] The definition of quickly, without control, may very well depend on the specific food or drink and on the specific person’s caloric and liquid needs. See the response of R. Yishmael b. R. Yossi in b. Pesahim 86b.
[6] Additionally: the idea that there are ten obligations, both to our fellow humans and to God, that we must and have fulfilled before filling our own bellies also raises our conduct to more than animalistic.
[7] This is especially so in cultures in which one squatted instead of sitting on a seat (see Josephus, War of the Jews 1471-49 and the description of “covering feet” in m. Yoma 3:2), although this rule was not necessarily limited to those situations; it probably included situations in which one used a toilet seat inasmuch as such were continuously found among some people in Israel (cf. m. Tamid 1:1, t. Para 12:17) since the Iron Age (Magness 2002, 107).
[8] Although these laws are understood by many to apply to all Israelites (eg. Halberstam 2010, 20-22), these laws only make sense as directives to priests.  While we do find that the impurity of carrion consumption is to be avoided and the impurity from contact with death is to be overcome, there is no directive here to overcome sexual impurity or to avoid it.  There is simply a description of impurity.  Thus, this descriptive statement would be relevant only to people for whom the attempt to avoid impurity is a directive.
[9] As the Zohar elaborated later, the righteous couple should reframe sex as holy by limiting it to and engaging in it on the peaceful Shabbat when a Jew and the Divine unite (תיקוני זוהר תקונא שתיתאה, כב ע"ב; תיקוני זוהר תקונא עשרין וחד ועשרין, סא ע"א), when the parties are less harried and can reclaim their mutual affection (תיקוני זוהר תקונא עשרין וחד ועשרין, נז ע"א).
[10] This injunction, which is repeated in the Zohar, is clearly not a weirdly specific instruction (contra Beitchman 1998, 33) but rather a call for mutual dignity in sex.

Thursday, April 12, 2012

A Quick Thought

This is a follow-up to the last posting:
The consensus claim of the leading pre-modernity sages, across ideological camps, was that sins are actions or behaviors that explicably hurt people,[1] that “there is a reason for every precept” (Guide to the Perplexed 3:26) – whether it is directed to the needs of the individual or of society.[2]  As Rambam said, the only difference between the precepts in terms of explicability is that those “commandments whose object is generally evident are called ‘judgements’ (mishpatim); those whose object is generally not clear are called ‘ordinances’ (chukim)” (Guide to the Perplexed 3:26).


[1] For example, see R. Moshe Nahmanides’ (Catalonia 1194 – 1270) commentary to Deuteronomy 22:6 and R. Shlomo Ephraim b. Aaron Luntschitz’s (Poland–Prague, 1550–1619) Keli Yakar commentary to Deuteronomy 30:11-14.  This point has also been acknowledged by traditional Jews in some penitential prayers; see, for example, the first penitential prayer of the set that is recited on the eve of Rosh Hashana according to the various European customs.
[2] Guide to the Perplexed 3:26 and Mishne Torah, Principles of the Torah 4:13.

Monday, March 12, 2012


Halakha in Modernity
 In modern times, there has been a defensive Modern Orthodox transformation of all of ritual Halakha into Divine fiat.  Some have argued academically that a rigorous analysis of Talmudic sources reveals that the rabbis interpreted ritual norms restrictively because they did not understand those norms and so “had little choice” (Spero 1983, 52-53).  Most, however, have adopted the formal method developed by R. Hayyim Soloveitchik of Brisk (1853-1918).  In the words of an American doyen of the ideology of Jewish Law as purely formal law, R. Dr. J. David Bleich:
Other than to the extent that historical context is explicitly referenced in a given teshuva, or to the extent that such context is implied by the manner in which facts are presented, historical context is irrelevant.  If there is any single factor that distinguishes talmidei hakhamim from “scholars,” it is that the… former regard halakha as objective, eternal and immutable.”[1]
Instead of seeing the human concerns that a given law is balancing or at least addressing, this doyen treats words or categories as objectively real concepts that have no explicability beyond the logical concept.  Accordingly, he argued that “to formulate the hakirah [the analysis] is to recognize the answer” (Bleich 2006, 98).
This claim of inexplicability has met several modern needs:
  1. As discussed in my dissertation (V-A), it served to defend Jewish Law against the hegemonic challenges of the (regionally varied) Enlightenment to the values of traditional Jewish culture.  It did so by transforming Jewish law into a purely logical structure of precise terminological and conceptual definition rather than an attempted balance of human needs.
  2. It also allowed Halakhically observant Jews to identify themselves as participants in the hegemonic liberal Western culture for which particularistic “religious reasoning is categorized as the product of special revelation rather than universal rationality,”[2] a reasoning that can be tolerated because it recognizes that its claims are based on a private epistemological foundation and so has no right to try to impose its practices, values, and reasoning on others.[3]
  3. Most importantly, this claim of inexplicability helped observant Jews protect Halakhic norms from the dissipation that a subgroup’s norms would face if they were unpacked in front of “the pluralizing, relativizing forces of modernity” (Aydin and Colak 2004, 224).
However, the fact that some Jews at some times have had an ideological need to prioritize their loyalty to God’s inexplicable laws over their loyalty to a substantive tradition, does not mean that traditionalist rabbinic sages of the law refrained from understanding the goals of the various Judaic norms.  Not only have both both religious approaches long existed in Judaism,[4] but more importantly, the examples I have examined elsewhere illustrated that whenever the choice of how to practice a given norm had serious ramifications on people’s lives, the rabbinic legal sages always related to the substantive human concerns underlying that norm.

A Problem With the Logico-Conceptual Approach

In this modern model, Jewish law is formally analytical; it is treated as a law whose logical concepts can be discovered but whose purpose is inexplicable.  In other words, it is treated as inexplicable concepts.  For a light example: R. Bleich pointed out that once one notices that the Saturday-night blessing over ending Shabbat is both added to and recited independently of the evening prayer, one realizes that it is not an evening blessing per se but rather a blessing to end Shabbat, which is “associate[d]… with the first shemoneh esreh [prescribed prayer] recited after the conclusion of Shabbat” (Bleich 2006, 98).  On that basis, R. Bleich argued that since the blessing over ending Shabbat is not an evening blessing per se, R. Hayyim Brisk was necessarily correct in concluding that one who missed the evening prayer and prays an additional prayer in the morning in lieu of the missed evening prayer should recite the Saturday-night blessing over ending Shabbat in the first prescribed prayer that he does recite and not in the second that is in lieu of the missed evening prayer (ibid).  He rejected as shallow positivists those who ruled that the blessing should be recited in the second prayer that is in lieu of the missed evening prayer (ibid n.16).
If one treats norms as logical expressions of formal concepts, R. Bleich is correct.  If the requirement to bless God over ending Shabbat is not part and parcel of the prescribed evening prayer but its own concept, it necessarily should be recited in the first prayer that one prays after Shabbat even if that prayer is a morning prayer.  However, once one considers the human context of the law, one notices that the reason that the primary (= Biblical) need to distinguish between Shabbat and the week only applies Saturday night – while the requirement to recite that blessing afterward if it was missed on Saturday night is a secondary (= Rabbinic) need – is because the new morning provides an overriding experiential distinction between Shabbat and the following week.    Thus, one could argue that on Sunday morning it is more important to recite the no longer Biblically necessary blessing in the second prayer, the prayer that substitutes for the missed night prayer.  This way, one reinforces the norm that the blessing must be recited on Saturday night and cannot be left to the morning.  Of course, one could also argue that reciting the blessing in the added prayer is worse because it will inculcate a mistaken notion that the blessing must be recited in a prayer and thus cannot be recited until the morning if one who had prayed at night forgot the blessing during the prayer.


The point is that the conceptual non-contextual approach treats norms as explicable by concepts but treats concepts as inexplicable and context-free.  It ignores the fact “that before attempting to translate our data into the rigorous language of symbols, it is above all things necessary to ascertain the intended import of the words we are using” (Boole 1854, 60).




[1] Lamm 2007.
[2] Anand 2004, 296-297.
[3] For example, see Moses Mendelssohn’s variation of this claim (in Sorkin 1996, 38).
[4] As pointed out by R. Yekusiel Yehuda Halberstam, the Sanz-Klausenberg Rebbe (1905-1994), in Responsa Divrei Yatziv OH #260.

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Learning Tanakh

To those who are not familiar with TaNa”Kh, I want to recommend a relatively easy course of annual study.
· In addition to:
1. following the traditional obligations to both review the Torah (Pentateuch) annually via the weekly sidrot שו"ע או"ח רפה:א, רפה:ה = קמו:ב
2. and reading the holiday-appropriate NaK”h books on holidays (מסכת סופרים יד:א ),
· one can read 2 chapters per day from the rest of Tanakh on the other weekdays, the non-Sabbath (תוספתא מגילה ג:ה, מגילה לב ע"א, משנ"ב תכט:א ) and non-Holiday (קדושין ל ע"א) days.

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Discovering G-d

After years of trying to figure out how to teach the experience of finding G-d (as I have tried to teach the steps of intuitive thinking etc), I have realized one step that works for those who would like to have G-d but are too angry to find such: Forgive people - self and significant others [parent; sibling; spouse; friend] - and at least begin by forgiving humanity in general including oneself and others in general.

Friday, October 15, 2010

Sedgwick's Last Book - on Reading Without Charity

To theorize out of anything but a paranoid, critical stance has come to seem naive, pious, or complaisant. [Unfortunately] A monopolistic strategy of anticipating negative affect can have according to [Jane] Tomkins, the effect of entirely blocking the potential operative goal of seeking positive affect….[;] The monopolistic program of paranoid knowing systematically disallows any recourse to reparative motives…. Reparative motives, once they become explicit are, are inadmissible in paranoid theory… because they are frankly ameliorative (“merely reformist”)….
p.126, 136, 144
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: affect, pedagogy, performativity. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.

Sunday, September 19, 2010

Back from a Long Overdue Break: Another Person's Summary of the Method

His (Your) theory argues that traditional poskim, far from understanding the halakhic system as a static given (a legal system as object) have a (largely unstated) understanding of specific halakhot as the embodiment of attempts to achieve consequences consonant with the overall aims of the Halakha as a consistent and coherent ethical system.

Nechama Hadari

Thank you Nechama!