The Rules of
Quantities
In my upcoming book, I show that Tannaitic through early Medieval Byzantine Halakha treated no lived norms as Divine fiats. Here, I will briefly address the existence
of another area of law that apparently has been treated as ontologically real
and unresponsive to changed conditions.
These are the rules of quantities.
These include rules regarding the quantities of food that one must eat
or must avoid. Although these rules are
never declared fiats, Amoraic declarations that the traditions of quantities
are ancient traditions that go back to Sinai[1] could lead one to think that these rabbis approached the rules of
quantities as non-contextually dependent.
It is true that there were sages who posited that a contemporary
Sanhedrin is the body that always establishes the contemporary quantities.[2] Nonetheless, the former Amoraim
seemingly would consider measurements to be Divine fiats.
That distinction
between Amoraic approaches, however, is simplistic. Even the Babylonian Amoraim who stated that quantities were
Sinaitic learned the earlier Tannaitic debates over the legally significant
quantities for different prescriptions or commandments.[3] Thus even the position that the
rules of quantities are Sinaitic took into account the fact that the quantities
were debated. Accordingly, their
ideological statement that all the quantities are from Sinai, cannot exclude
the realization that quantities are contextual and experiential since there are
no other bases for debating the different quantities of food that one must eat
or must avoid for various mitzvoth and proscriptions.
The modernist
Orthodox Talmudist and historian R. Zvi Chajes (Galicia, 1806-1855) offered an
explanation to the question of how measurements could have been viewed both as
Sinaitic and as debatable. He suggested
that the possible sizes (such as the sizes of an olive, date or egg) are
Sinaitic but that human sages decided which measurements to apply to each issue
on the basis of the experiential considerations that underlie each issue.[4] In Saussarian terms, [5] Chajes’
explanation assumed that there is a Sinaitic cultural langue of Halakhic
sizes within which humans have decided the Halakhic parole of how to
play out the range of sizes.
However:
although Chajes’ explanation complements this book’s finding that Tannaim
through Amoraim treated norms as context dependent, the explanation needs
improvement in light of Mishnaic counter-evidence. The Mishna both records that Tannaim debated the precise size of
some of the designated measurements[6] – such as the
size of an olive. They even argued that
the size of a designated measurement – such as the size of an olive – is not
consistent; it differs for different Halakhic issues. [7] Thus: although the Tannaim utilized the
sizes of real objects, they did not have a fixed list with fixed definitions;
they simply explained their positions against the available background of
produce and body parts. In short, even
the langue was both vague and debated.
A better explanation
of the Mishnaic evidence and one that more accurately reflects how quantities
become decided historically is the explanation offered by a contemporary
Sanz-Klauzenberg hasid, R. Yaakov Meir Weider.
He suggests that it was only the basic and shared understandings of an
issue that Amoraim viewed as Sinaitic.
For example, all Tannaim agreed that a sukka dwelling booth must be at
least large enough for an individual to live in it – since the whole idea of a
sukka is to “dwell” in a temporary hut.
That understanding was viewed as being Sinaitic. Amoraim differed only over whether the
definition of “large enough for an individual to live in” need include a table.[8] This explanation not only better fits the
Tannaitic evidence on this issue, which we just mentioned. Rather, it is line with this book’s finding
that since Tannaitic through Amoraic Halakha was based on understanding norms
contextually so were there debates always around shared concerns; in a living
culture, there is a great degree of a shared sense of what a practice is about
in spite of minor differences of emphasis that can lead to debates regarding
the shared practice. More importantly
for this book’s thesis, Weider’s explanation suggests that rabbinic sages would
compare the example of the practice that they had received with contemporary
conditions.
Neither explanation can be proven. However, this last explanation is more
likely in light of the fact that it both explains how an Amora could consider
measurements to be Sinaitic even as measurements are debated and complements
our other findings on Tannaitic through Amoraic law as contextual law. Moreover, in the next volume of this work we
will see that this was the approach of leading rabbis in the modern
period. We will see that seeming rabbinic
distortions of the traditional measurements in the modern period were new
phrasings of these traditional and continuous human considerations. Thus: it would not be surprising was this
the case during the Tannaitic through Amoraic periods, too.
(These are my preliminary thoughts.)
[1] Rav in b. Sukka 5b; R. Yohanan in y. Pe’a 1:1 and b. Yoma 80a.
[2] R. Hoshaya in y. Pe’a 1:1 along with R. Yona and R. Yossi.
[3] For example, see m. Beitza 1:1; baraita b.
Beitza 7b; baraita b. Yoma 79b.
[4] Novella MaHaRa”Tz Hayyot, Yoma 80a.
[5] Saussure 1966, 14.
[6] m. Kelim 17:6, 10.
[7] m. Kelim 17:9-10 et al. This is aside from the fact that different parts of the country indicated different sizes/volumes via the same terms (Sifrei Zuta, Bamidbar 15:19).
[8] Weider 1994, 43-45. Note: As a
Sanz-Klauzenberg Hasid, R. Yaakov Meir Weider probably borrowed this
explanation from R. Yekutiel Halberstam (1904-1955) – the posek and rebbe of
the Sanz-Klausenberg Hassidic dynasty who offered this explanation only as
regards those Amoraim who held that the measurements are not Sinaitic (Responsa
Divrei Yatziv OH 262:3).
