(selections from)
Chapter Five: Wise Hukkim
and
The Byzantine Sermonic Ideology of a
Solitary Divine Fiat
Elisha
Ancselovits
…
B. The Sifra’s Distinction Between Particularistic and
Social Laws
Theoretically, this
chapter showing that Tannaim did not believe in inexplicable Divine fiats
should be unnecessary. We should be
able to simply point out that most Tannaitic commentary followed late Second
Temple sources[1]
in viewing the Biblical words “hukkim” and “mishpatim” as synonymous
designations for “laws”.[2] We should be able to simply point out that
even the merely two Tannaitic elaborations on the word hukkim also
discuss laws that are explicable:
- In one
version of R. Yehoshua’s elaboration on Exodus 15:26, the Biblical word hukkim
is translated as the additional norms implied by the Torah’s legal
examples.[3] This version parallels the words of a
Sifra editor whom we quoted in an earlier chapter (II-E3): “‘All the hukkim
(statutes)’ – these are the midrashot (exegeses)” (Sifra
Shemini 1:9). It parallels the
late Second Temple sources that designate the righteous teacher of the law
who pointed additional norms implied by Biblical laws by the title of me-hokek
(CD 6.7-8). (In another version, the order is changed and R.
Yehoshua followed the broader trend of reading the Biblical word hukkim
as simply halakhot.[4])
- The other
elaboration – that of R. Eleazar haModa’i[5] and a
Sifra editor[6] – referred
to a local Biblical use of word hukkim that discusses “rules
forbidding taboo sexual relations.”
Sexual taboos were viewed as common sense: the first generation
Amora, Shmuel, pointed out that these sexual taboos were decreed to all of
humanity from its inception (b. Sanhedrin 60a) while his contemporary,
Rav, taught that a Noahide must be willing to sacrifice his life in order
to avoid these taboo sexual relations (b. Sanhedrin 57a); Rav and Shmuel
explicitly claimed – in rabbinic terminology – that the taboos should be
obvious to all people.
However, in spite of the evidence that the Tannaim had no concept of
inexplicable Divine fiat,[7] the following
misread midrash makes this chapter necessary.
A Sifra midrash distinguishes between the
Torah’s social laws that are common to many cultures and the Torah’s
particularistic laws:
“You
shall fulfill my judgments" (Leviticus 18:4)
These are the
matters that are written in the Torah which, had they not been written, would
obviously have to be written: theft,
sexually taboo relationships, alien worship [i.e. idolatry], cursing the Name,
and murder. Had they not been written, they
would obviously have had to be written.
[“and
observe my hukkim” (Leviticus 18:4)]
These are the matters which one’s evil
inclination and the idolatrous nations of the world retort against: the
consumption of pig, the wearing of mixed fibers, the release of a levirate
wife, the purification of the leper, and the goat that is cast out. Because the evil inclination and the
idolatrous nations of the world retort against them, it teaches:
"I,
the Eternal” (Leviticus 18:5) decreed [them];
you
have no right to retort against them.
(Sifra, Aharei Mot 9:13:10)[8]
In light of the fact that the defense of the particularistic norms is:
“I the Eternal decreed; you have no right to retort against them”, academic
scholars have understandably misread the midrash as stating that hukkim are
inexplicable Divine fiats.[9]
We will now see, however, that a reading
of the whole midrashic passage – instead of merely these two paragraphs –
clarifies the meaning of God’s response in the midrash. We will first see that the Sifra responded
to Hellenistic critics of Jewish Law by arguing the opposite – that all of the
Torah’s laws are the most ancient traditions and wise practices. This was in line with earlier sources that
translated hukkim as ancient (Targumim[10])
and righteous (Septuagint and Philo[11])
norms – δικαιωματα. We will then see that it was
only against Pauline Christians who claimed to be believers in God and yet
retorted against His decrees[12] via Biblical
verses that the midrash passage added a further argument. We will see that the midrash’s closing
argument rebukes Pauline ideology that justified dismantling Biblical Law to
match current Gentile practice for the supposed fulfillment of the Torah. Instead of arguing for Divine fiat, the
midrash rebuked Pauline ideology by aptly citing the closing words of the
Biblical command to avoid being drawn after the bad norms of another culture
(Leviticus 18:2-4): “I the Eternal” decreed.
The midrashic passage begins with a
response to the claim by politically hegemonic Hellenes that Gentile norms are
ancient wise traditions[13] (conventions)
while particularistic Jewish religious norms are excessive and
unnecessary. The midrash responds both
by arguing that Torah norms are superior to Hellenistic cultural norms in being
more ancient and wiser since they come from God and by condemning as
problematic sexual practices and cruel practices long condoned by Hellenistic
cultures. First it condemns Hellenistic
practices:
[I the Eternal am your God.
You shall not imitate the practices of the land of Egypt in which you
dwelt, or of the land of Canaan to which I am bringing you; in their hukkim you
shall not walk. My rules you shall
observe, and my hukkot you shall follow: I the Eternal am your God. You shall keep my hukkot and my judgments, through the
observance of which a man shall live: I am the Eternal. (Leviticus 18:3-5)]
"You
shall not imitate the practices of the land of Egypt […] and the practices of
the land of Canaan”
Could this mean that they [the
Israelites] should not build such buildings or plant such plants as they do,
therefore it says:
"In
their hukkim you shall not walk"
I
[God] did not speak except in [regard to] hukkim that are
legislated/engraved[14] [i.e.
ingrained] for them, for their fathers, and for their grandfathers.
What
would they do? A man would be married
to a man and a woman to a woman, a man would marry a woman and her daughter,
and a woman would be married to two.
Therefore it
says: "in their hukkim you shall not walk". …
What
did [Scripture] come to teach in saying: "And in their hukkim you
may not walk" (Leviticus 18:3)?
That you should
not walk in their cultural norms – in things that have been legislated/engraved[15] (i.e.
ingrained) for them (i.e. ancient conventions), such as theaters, circuses, and
gladiator arenas….
Then the midrash argues for the sagacity and hoary authority of Jewish
cultural practices:
Lest
you say, 'They have hukkim (i.e. ancient conventions) and
we do not have hukkim', it comes and teaches us:
"My laws
you shall observe and my hukkim you shall maintain to walk in them; I am
the Eternal your God" (Leviticus 18:4).
The
evil inclination can still hope to denigrate and say that theirs are better
than ours, so it comes to teach us:
"[I have
taught you hukkim and judgments….] Maintain them and do them, for it is
your wisdom and your insight" (Deuteronomy 4:[5-]6).
(Sifra, Aharei Mot 9:12:8)[16]
The
midrash responded to the Hellenistic claim of cultural superiority by asserting
first that the Jewish norms (hukkim) are the truly ancient norms in
coming from God and second that they are the truly wise norms that come from
God.
In light of the midrash's argument
that hukkim are the hoariest and wisest laws, the end of this midrashic
section (which we saw above) cannot be read as a claim of inexplicable Divine
fiat. A claim of inexplicability would
contradict the midrash passage’s argument.
In fact, a review of the linguistic and historical evidence reveals that
the concluding argument is an additional response directed to Pauline Christians
who claimed that God and Tanakh do not want ritual norms actualized in
practice. The midrash’s conclusion
argues that the God of Tanakh whom these Pauline Christians claim to accept
forbids them to reject his norms even when some people argue that the norms are
wrong or nonsensical.
We have three points of evidence for the
fact that the midrash’s conclusion was directed against Pauline Christians:
a. One: the
conclusion rebukes a group that both accepted God and Tanakh and yet attacked
Halakhic Judaism on these five particular ritual norms: (1) the consumption of
pig, (2) the wearing of mixed fibers, (3) the removal of a levirate wife, (4)
the purification of the leper, and (5) the goat that is cast out.
b. Two: A later
midrashic editor on a similar list by R. Levi of Tiberias[17] (a third
century Eretz-Israel Amora) wrote that the problematic common trait of these
laws is that the Torah itself appears to uphold these laws inconsistently.[18] This is a characterization that readily
applies to the Sifra’s list, too (including the law of purification of the
leper[19]). However, this characterization does not
explain why this group attacked the Biblically consistent proscription of pig
and why it ignored other Biblical laws that appear to be inconsistent.[20] We, therefore, realize that this group’s
ideology must have both attacked these specific four specific laws as
inconsistent and attacked the injunction against consuming pig although it is
not inconsistent.
c. Third: The Sifra
identified this ideological position as shared both by some Jews’ evil
inclinations and by idolatrous gentiles while another Tannaitic source
identifies those Jews who attack Biblical legal contradiction as Epicureans.[21] However: although Epicurean ideology did
deny piety through ritual[22] and Tannaim did
describe Epicurean attacks on Biblical legal inconsistency, this midrash’s
citation of God’s response does not seem to be directed at Epicureans. Citing God’s response that nobody has a
right to retort would be a very weak midrashic move against Epicureans. It would not be an inconceivable move,[23] but it would be
unlikely. However, Christians were
often linked with Epicureans in the second century CE of the Roman Empire.[24] In fact, R. Yohanan of Tiberias explicitly
applied the Tannaitic call for diligent defense against Epicurean charges of Biblical
legal inconsistencies to Christians.[25]
These
three points of evidence reveal that the midrash was directed against Pauline
Christians. Pauline Christianity was
heavily identified with Gentiles[26] of “the
idolatrous nations” but also included Jews[27] misled by “the
evil inclination”.[28] Furthermore: as we will now see, Pauline
Christianity of the Tannaitic through Amoraic period challenged these five
specific laws as irrelevant and inconsistent.
Three of the laws referenced in the
midrash were attacked by Pauline Christianity as irrelevant:
a. The first law in
the Sifra’s list is the injunction against the consumption of pig. Jews and Romans/Hellenists alike were
conscious of the cultural distinction between Jews who’s Torah forbids the
consumption of pig and Romans who celebrated the consumption of pig.[29] The tension over this issue is highlighted
by the fact that although the pig is listed explicitly in the Torah as a
forbidden animal, another Sifra passage (Shemini 6:7) bothered to justify the proscription of pig: in response to those
Jews in the hegemonic Roman and Hellenistic culture who argued that the fact
that a pig is hoofed similarly to other kosher animals should suffice to make
it acceptable, that Sifra passage pointed out that a kosher animal must also be
a true (herbivore) ruminant as opposed to a (resource destructive) omnivore
pig. (We will see more on the Biblical and rabbinic opposition to pig as a
destructive animal, below ??).
Similarly, R. Eleazar b. Azarya described even some observant Jews who
were uncomfortable with stating that pig is forbidden and preferred to say, “I
don’t want to eat pig”.[30] In line with this reality, our Sifra
passage, responded to an even more religiously significant challenge to the
injunction against eating pig than the fact that some sinful Jews ate pig or
were embarrassed over the fact that they avoided pig; worse than the mere
reality that some of the more Romanized Jews ate pig[31] was the
ideological challenge of the Pauline church of the “idolatrous nations” that
invalidated both the Jewish ethical practice (as discussed below ??) and
cultural marker of avoiding pig.[32] For example, the late first century–early
second century CE Epistle of Barnabas[33] claims that the
Biblical injunction against the consumption of pig is only an allegorical
injunction against associating with disgusting people.[34]
Faced with a Christian challenge to the
legitimacy of the Biblical law forbidding the consumption of pig, this Sifra
midrash did not merely assert that the Jewish ritual norms (hukkim) are
the only truly ancient traditional and wise human norms that come from
God. Rather, it also rebuked those
Gentile Christians and Jews to whom the Tannaim could not communicate the
norm’s wisdom as they saw it because these people were not inclined to seek
Biblical Law’s wisdom in permitting herbivores alone.[35] The midrash rebuked those Pauline Christians
as having no right to ignore the fact that God Himself forbade pig.[36]
b. The fourth law
in the Sifra’s and the parallel Amoraic midrash’s list is the purification
ritual – whether of sprinkled blood or of muddy ashes.[37] The Sifra lists purification of the cured
leper, a person who had successfully repented of a sin that had caused him this
severe illness.[38] The Amoraic midrash lists purification of
the person who had ended the first week of impurity over human death (a
phenomenon also attributed to sin – Genesis ch2). These purification rites, that were explicable to the Tannaim (as
we will see below ??), were attacked by Gentile Christians: Not only did the
first century CE Epistle to the Hebrews[39] declare that
Jesus’ death and blood sprinkles the repentant believer and immerses him in
pure water. Rather, the Pauline Epistle
to the Romans[40] [and the Epistle
to the Hebrews[41]] even imply or
can be read to imply that Jesus’ blood had replaced the need for a red heifer.[42] More significantly, contemporary Christian
sources such as the Epistle of Barnabas[43] declared
explicitly that the Biblical commandment of purification via a red heifer is a
prophecy of Jesus’ coming and not a ritual commandment.
Once again – given these challenges to the
legitimacy of this biblical law – the midrash not only asserted that the Torah
norms (hukkim) are the only truly ancient and wise norms, in coming from
God. Rather, the midrash further
asserted that even the wisdom-challenged Christians have no right to tamper
with God’s decrees.
c. The fifth law in
the Sifra, the law of the Yom Kippur scapegoat, finds similar explanation. A common Christian claim,[44] found for
example in the Epistle to Barnabas[45] and drawing
even on Matthew,[46] was that Jesus
was the ultimate scapegoat who replaced the need for such sacrificial
atonement. Once again, the midrash
responded to this explicable ritual by asserting that Christians do not have a right
to tamper with God’s law.[47]
Thus far, we have seen that three of the
five commandments for which the midrash offered the response of Divine Decree
were unnecessary under Pauline theology and a challenge to the Gentile ideology
that Jesus’ person had replaced these practices. We will now see that the other two laws rankled Gentile
Christians even further and were condemned as inconsistent:
a. As regards the
critique of the law of levirate release,[48] Greek and Roman
societies – and thus Pauline Christians – were officially monogamous[49] and had no
levirate ties. Thus, not only those
Middle Eastern Pauline Christians who opposed marriage[50] but even those
Gentile Christians who allowed marriage for the laity[51] were astounded
by remarriage[52] and especially
by marriage between a man and his (Biblically forbidden) sister-in-law.[53] Accordingly: it is not surprising that in
spite of Deuteronomy’s explicit statement that a man’s levirate marriage with
his childless brother’s wife was for the sake of the dead brother‘s memory,[54] Gentile
Christians ridiculed a claim that a man could have a marital tie with a woman
who had been forbidden to him as a relative and would still have been forbidden
to him as a relative had the brother died with children.[55]
b. The proscription
against wearing clothes of expensive linen in which high quality wool is woven[56] so that the
linen clothes can be dyed or wearing expensive and dyable silk and sea silk[57] challenged
Roman values. Roman ideology, in
contrast to Biblical and rabbinic ideology that permitted only wearing cheaper
dyed wool clothes and plain linen clothes[58], valued class
and wealth distinctions in dress – such as the upper classes wearing dyed linen
and even silk.[59] However, the rabbis did not merely forbid
such fancy clothes and condemn men who dressed up in fancy red wool togas with
with fancy adornment shields on the holidays.[60] Rather, Deuteronomy and the Tannaim
challenged Roman cultural values further by pushing for high class equalization
in dress; Deuteronomy and the Tannaim expected every Jewish citizen to wear the
same expensive dyed stripes of status on their cloaks – a merely woolen thread
died with expensive Tyrian blue on each corner of one’s himation [Greek],
pallium [Latin], or tallit [Aramaic].[61]
Since these equalizing forms of dress[62]conflicted with
Roman ideology,[63] opponents not
only ridiculed the Biblical proscription against wearing linen in which dyeable
wool was woven[64] but also
ridiculed it as inconsistent with the obligation to add blue wool fringes dyed
with expensive Tyrian blue.[65] As the midrashic editor of R. Levi’s list
(above) explicitly stated, the injunction against wearing linen garments into
which dyeable wool had been woven was ridiculed as inconsistent with the fact
that Dueteronomy obligated Tyrian blue woolen fringes on all cloaks – including
linen cloaks.[66]
That the obligatory blue fringes mark of
equality rankled those rich Jews and Christians who shared the Roman ideology
finds further support from a midrash that commented on the Biblical rebellion
of Korah and various renowned Israelites and Levites.[67] The Biblical passage easily reads as a story
of rebellious aristocrats who claim contradictorily that leadership should be
transferred away from the failed leader[68] Moses, who had
grabbed power away from the Israelites who are all holy,[69] and that
leadership should be granted to another individual or class.[70] Thus: just as earlier Jews had recognized
this story as the story of demagogues who try to come to power via democratic
claims,[71] the following
midrash presented Korah as a type of demagogue. It presented Korah as arguing that instead of having to wear
fringes dyed with Tyrian blue he and his followers should be allowed to adopt
the High Priest’s aristocratic garment of Tyrian blue (Exodus 28:31-32) with no
fringes. This claim by the rich of the
right to distinguish themselves from the rank and file commoners by wearing
aristircratic garments of Tyrian blue (without equalizing fringes) was a very
Roman claim.[72] Similarly: this midrash’s Korah argued that the
rich should also be allowed to distinguish themselves from the poor as the
Roman rich copied the aristocracy – through owning personal libraries of the
classics[73] – and freeing
themselves from the commoners’ minimalist door-scroll (mezuza):[74]
Korah challenged Moses: What is the law regarding a himation that is
completely dyed with Tyrian blue?
[Moses] answered: It is obligated in fringes.
[Korah] replied: If the fact that the whole garment is dyed Tyrian
blue does not suffice, will four threads do so?
[Korah challenged Moses:] What is the law regarding a house full of
[Biblical] scrolls?
[Moses] answered: It is obligated in a mezuzah.
[Korah] replied: If [a whole scroll of] 275 sections do[es] not exempt
the house, one section will do so? You
were not commanded regarding these matters but rather made them up yourself. …
When Moses relayed: “And they shall add a thread of Tyrian-blue to the
corner fringes”, Korach ordered two hundred and fifty Tyrian-blue himations and
those same [two hundred and fifty] heads of synhedrons [a Greek name for
political and friendship alliances] that rose against Moses wrapped themselves
in them.
(Bamidbar Rabbah, chapter 18 – and
parallels)
According to this midrash, Korah tried to upturn these equalizing rule
by claiming that God never told Moses and Aaron that all Jews must wear
equalizing fringes and have an equalizing minimalist mezuzah on their doors –
in the same way that wealthy non-aristocratic
Romans claimed the legitimacy to arrogate equivalent status for
themselves[75] in distinction
from the less wealthy and the poor.[76]
The Pauline Christians in our Sifra
midrash parallel this last midrash’ contemporary versions of Korah. They both argued against the inconsistency
of the rule of wearing dyed woolen threads.
They both favored the right to wear expensive Tyrian blue cloaks. In response, this last midrash exposed the
rich people’s claim of equality with the aristocracy as a cynical attempt to
become upper class. In response, our
Sifra midrash had God rebuke them. This
battle is even reflected in Tannaitic Halakha.
Tannaim forbade extravagantly expensive real silk and sea silk less
severely than dyed linen;[77] these materials
were less relevant to social tensions since they were out of reach to any but
select people in the Roman Empire.
In
short: all five of the commandments listed in this midrash were not viewed as
inexplicable by the rabbis themselves.
Rather, these commandments challenged Roman Hellenistic Christian
theology and mores, and so these commandments became viewed by Pauline
Christians as self-contradictory.
The Sifra responded to these Pauline
claims to subvert the Bible from within the Bible by rebuking those who
arrogantly tamper with God’s law. The
Sifra responded to the Pauline challengers of these Biblical laws, to those
people who “know Him but deny Him” (t. Shabbat 13:5) in the name of “a Son who
has been made perfect forever” [Hebrews 7:28], by labeling these Christians
“idolatrous nations” and Jews led astray by “the evil inclination”. [78] The Sifra pointed out that the God that
these people allege to accept had decreed these laws:
[Although] the
evil inclination and the idolatrous nations of the world refute these
practices, the verse [itself] teaches: "I the Eternal” decreed it;
you have no right to refute them [i.e. the Eternal laws].”
At
no point, however did the Sifra reject its own claim that those people who are
not led astray by the evil inclination can indeed see the wisdom of these hukkim,
these most hoary of norms. The
Sifra’s insider position to Jews (above) was: “it is your wisdom and your
insight.”
…
[1] For example, see the use of the word mishpatim in 1QS 6.6-8, CD 7.7-8,
CD 14.7-8 and of the word hukkim in 1QS 10.10, CD 4.7-8, 1QSa 1.7 (sources that
are all juxtaposed for a different point in Fraade 2011, 50-55 and notes).
[2] Sifrei Bamidbar Korah #119; et al.
[3] Mechilta, Yitro – Parsha 2.
[4] ??.
[5] Mechilta, Yitro – Parsha 2 (and Mekhilta, Beshalah – Parsha 1).
[6] Aharei Mot 9:13:22.
[7] A variant claim is the claim by early Amoraim, that hukkim are
those laws that demand loyalty to the laws of nature (y. Kilayim 1:7; cf.
Shmuel in b. Kiddushin 39a = b. Sanhedrin 60a).
[8] Cf. baraita b. Yoma 67b and parallels.
[9] Kadushin 1964, 44-45; Ross 1992, 202 n.16; Fine 2003, 189; et al. Cf. Novak 1997, 62.
[10] For example: the Targumim to Leviticus 18:4 and Deuteronomy 4:6-8. A variation of this definition of hukkim
as ancient cultural norms is the definition of hukkim as the hoary
holidays (Exodus Rabba [Vilna] 15:25) and Shabbat (Midrash Aggada [Buber]
18:20), an understanding that is attributed as far back as the first generation
Eretz-Israel amora, R. Yohanan (Shir haShrim Rabba [Vilna] Parsha 1).
[11] As noted by Harry Wolfson (1947, 335).
[12] Cf. t. Shabbat 13:1.
[13] For some Greek and Roman sources on trusting ancient laws, see Zlotnick
1988, 139-143.
[14] This is presumably a play on Hellenistic pride in the laws of Solon.
[15] This is presumably a play on Greek pride in the laws of Solon.
[16] And parallels.
[17] R. Yehoshua of Sakhnin said in the name of
[his teacher] R. Levi: The evil inclination refutes four matters, and in all
them it is written “hukka”:
a.
a brother’s wife (Leviticus 18:5, 17),
b.
the [wearing of] mixing fibers (Leviticus 19:19),
c.
the goat that is cast out (Leviticus 16:26-29),
and
d.
the [red] heifer (Numbers ch.19).
(Pesikta de-Rav Kahana, 4; and parallels)
[18] A brother’s wife from:
“Do not uncover the nakedness of your brother’s wife” (Levitcus 18:17). [Yet]
it says “her levirate shall have sex with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5). In her life she is forbidden to him, [but]
if he dies without children she is permitted to him?!
And hukka is
written therein: “You shall keep my hukkot and my judgments, through the
observance of which a man shall live” (Leviticus 18:5).
[The
wearing of] mixed fibers from: “Do not wear adulterated, [wool and linen
together]” (Deuteronomy 22:11). [Yet] a linen garment with tzitzit [blue woolen
fringes] is permitted?!
And hukka is
written therein: “You shall keep my hukkot” (Leviticus 19:19, immediately
preceding the Levitical parallel to Deuteronomy 22:11).
The
goat that is cast out from: “He who sends off the goat to Azazel must wash his
clothes [and bathe his flesh in water in order to reenter the camp],”
(Leviticus 16:26). [Yet] it expiates
others?!
And hukka is
written therein: “This shall be for you an eternal huka“ (Leviticus
16:29).
[The
red] heifer from that which we learn: “All who deal with the heifer[‘s ashes’
preparation], from beginning until end impurify their priestly vestments” (m.
Para 4:4). [Yet] it purifies the impure?!
And
hukka is written therein: “And this is the huka of the Torah
[regarding human death]“ (Numbers 19:2).
(Pesikta de-Rav Kahana, 4; and parallels)
[19] The Sifra is an Akibean
Midrash and apparently ruled that a pure person who was sprinkled by the blood
and water that is meant to purify the leper becomes impure himself (see R.
Akiva’s ruling in Sifrei Bamidbar, Hukkat #129).
[21] “R. Eliezer/Eleazar says: Be diligent in studying Torah and know how
you will respond to an Epicurean [by showing that the words of Torah do not
contradict ]” (m. Avot 2:14; [Avot de-Rabi Natan A ch17, B
ch30]).
[22] Gill 1995, 81.
[23] For midrashim that
read God in the Pentateuch as addressing atheists, see Sifrei Devarim 329:39;
Sifrei Zuta 15:3; et al.
[24] Gilad 1995, 9 and n. 16.
[25] Lekah Tov – Pesikta Zutatra, Exodus 25. R. Yohanan pointed out that the Jewish critics are even worse and
greater fools; the Jewish ones believe that a child can be born out of a woman’s
own urine – paralleling the belief that when Abimelech was punished for taking
the matriarch Sara, God sealed not only the wombs but also the urine of all the
women of his household (cf. the Armenian commentary to Genesis attributed to
Ephrem the Syrian [1998, 105]).
[26] In fact, “Tacitus mentions Christians but… do[es] not describe them as
types of Jews" (Goodman 2007, 35).
[27] I realize that although current scholarship on Early Christianity
focuses on the facts that some Jewish-Christian (i.e. ritually observant)
groups were actually composed of people who were Gentiles by birth (Taylor
1995, 27-29; et al) and that many Jews who were Christians were ritually
observant members of the observant Jewish majority (Boyarin 2003, 288-289; et
al) current scholarship has not discussed the fact that some “Pauline”
Christians were Jewish. However, the
personal examples provided both by Jews such as Paul, Barnabas, and John [and
Stephen?] and by this midrash suggest that there were Pauline Christian (or
Gnostic, etc) Jews who rejected Halakha – even before the fourth century
Nazarene “Jewish Christians who rejected the ritual legislation of the Bible”
(Finkel 1981, 244). [In spite of the
divisive effect of the Great War between Jewish and Gentile Christians (Tomson
2003, 7), this evidence holds.]
In any case, Christian history is not my field, and I am aware of the great need for careful
historical research on the various streams of Jews who believed in Jesus in
some manner (as argued by Mimouni 1998, 472).
[28] This midrash could
be read as also referring to Samaritan Christians if some of the latter denied
the validity of Biblical laws just as figures such as Abiyyah and Dosa had done
– similarly to Samaritan followers of Simon of Gitta and other Samaritan
Gnostics. (On Samaritans and
Christianity, see the sources collected in Pummer 2002. On Samaritan sects in general, see Isser
1999, 576, 582-590 [and Isser 1976].)
However, further research would be necessary to show that the Sifra's
editor would bother responding to heretical Samaritans.
[29] Tacitus Histories 5:4; Juvenal Satires 14:97; Abot
de-Rabi Natan A ch.4; Bamidbar Rabba 20:21; Midrash Tannaim, Devarim 14:7; and
the wide range of sources referenced in Hadas-Lebel 2006, 517-521; Rosenblum
2010a, 95-110; and Rosenblum 2010b, 51-58.
[30] Sifra Kedoshim 10:22. In order
to understand why a Jew could also be embrassed to state that certain
Biblically proscribed sexual unions are forbidden (ibid), see Sifra Aharei Mot
9:8.
[31] For archeological evidence, see Lev-Tov 2003, 431.
[32] For sources on the significant cultural valence of avoiding pig, see:
Feldman 1993, 167-170.
[33] Chapter ten.
[34] I do not know
whether there was any continuity there was between these Jews and the extreme
allegorists described by Philo (On the Migration of Abraham #89-91) even as it
is true that the outstanding Christian allegorist, Origen (185-254 CE), was
Alexandrian.
[35] As we will see below: the reasons supported by the archeological data,
that some societies oppose the consumption of and thus the rearing of pig, are
pigs’ great (ab)use of water, the wastefulness of raising pigs – which provide
less secondary products – in comparison to other husbanded animals, pigs’
interference with intensive agriculture, and the destructiveness of pigs under
certain agro-pastoral and architectural conditions (Hesse and Wapnish 1998,
125-126). However: in spite of
Christian recognition that pig herds or sounders can act “crazy” (Mark 5:11-14;
Matthew 8:30-32; Luke 8:32-33), it would be nigh impossible to communicate those
ethico-economic considerations to a group that accepted as ethical the
structure of Roman-Hellenistic society; that would be similar to firm believers
in the ethics of a capitalist society and firm believers in the ethics of a
socialist society communicate trying to communicate with each other.
[36] Compare a “Jewish-Christian” critique of the Gentile Churches as people
who distorted Jesus’ message so that they may eat pig like the Romans (Pines
1968, 263, 267).
It is possible that the Midrash was not only responding to a gentile
critique of Jews’ avoidance of pig. It
may also have considered pig an emblematic metaphor of gentile Christians – as
people who merely claim to obey the God of the Torah but eat indiscriminately
just as the pig claims to be kosher due to its split hooves but does not chew
its cud.
[37] And bodily immersion.
[38] Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, 820-823; Klawans 2000, 98-104; Luke 17:19.
[39] 10:10-22.
[40] 6:4-13.
[41] 9:11-28. Cf. Hebrews 2:14-17.
[42] Although Mary Schmitt has shown that Hebrews does not deny the Law and
actually forbids abandoning the Law except for the Aaronide priesthood, it
seems clear to me that Hebrews has no eschatalogical vision of renewed
sacrifices (contra Schmitt 2009, 200-201).
[43] 8:1-10. For a discussion of
this passage, see Helyer 2002, 488-490.
[44] Paget 1994, 138-139; Baumgarten 2002, 213-214.
[45] Chapter seven.
[46] Chapter twenty-seven. This
reading of Matthew is strengthened if chapter twent-seven was directed to pagan
cultures in which a scapegoat would be a criminal or if it reflects a Jewish
(non-rabbinic) approach that still understood that the goat was meant to be
taken into the desert and killed by a criminal. (On that being the original
Biblical intent, see Westbrook and Lewis 2008, 417–422.)
[47] There were other, parallel, Eretz-Israel Amoraic responses – such as
positing that reciting the verses of an atonement sacrifice can replace
offering it (b. Taanit 27b).
[48] Admittedly, it might be tempting to read this critique as an
allegorical allusion to a Christian argument that God could not reclaim the
Jews just as a man cannot reclaim his released levirate wife (b. Yevamot 102b;
Cohen 2010, 81-82) – a claim that would parallel the later argument by Origen
(commentary to Matthew Bk14 ch19) that God had permanently divorced adulterous
Israel. However, we will now see that a
more accurate explanation of this critique, one that would be in line with the
critiques of the three laws discussed above, is that it was a critique of
actual levirate ties.
[49] For an explanation of the phenomenon, see Scheidel 2009, 283, 288-289.
[50] For that phenomenon, see Voobus 1951, 16-34, 53-54; Murray 1982, 6-9;
et al.
[51] Much of this debate became expressed most clearly only as Christianity
became increasingly entrenched and a language of political debate in the
fractured Roman Empire. It was the
Council of Gangra (362 CE) and the trial of the bishop Priscillian (385 CE)
that first punished as heretical the call for universal
celibacy, even as (Pope) Siricus of Rome defrocked married priests (387 CE) following
the public recommendation of the Roman synod (386 CE) and the earlier similar
decisions of the synods of Elvira (circa 306 CE) and of Ancyra (314 CE).
[52] For example: see Tertullian’s opposition to widows remarrying in To
His Wife 1:7; Exhortation to Chastity ch9; and Monogamy ch9.
[53] For example, see Tertullian, Monogamy ch7 and compare
Athenagoras, Embassy for the Christians ch33. [Although Roman Law
explicitly forbade all people to marry a sister-in-law only in 312 CE (Codex
Theodosianus 3.12.2 [Grubbs 2002, 162]), it had already ruled against this
phenomenon somewhat by forbidding bigamy in 285 CE (Falk 1966, 6).]
[54] Deuteronomy 25:5-10. This is
reinforced by further Biblical parallels as pointed out by Goodman 1993, 193
n.62.
[55] Note: there were some Tannaim who were of a somewhat similar
opinion. They ruled that levirate
release is the expected default standard and that levirate marriage is
permitted only to those who act out of purity and not lasciviousness (t.
Yevamot 6:9; baraita b. Yevamot 39b).
[56] To the exclusion of coarse wool, such as goat or camel wool (m. Kilayim
9:1).
[57] m. Kilayim 9:2. Sea silk was
also known as sea wool. [Yehuda Feliks
translates the word in a different context as scrap of real silk (Feliks 1982,
244).]
[58] On linen as a garment of richer people, see Ezekiel 16:10-13, Isiah
3:18-24, m. Taanit 4:8, et al. In
general, the Tannaim looked askance at a man who wore even plain linen cloaks
(y. Sanhedrin 2:8).
[59] Conti 2003, 182; et al.
[60] Sifrei Devarim, Re’e 81:30.
[61] Deuteronomy ch.12; (Numbers 15:39;) Sifrei Bamidbar #115; et al.
[62] Compare m. Sanhedrin 4:5.
[63] For example: see Parkin 2006, 77-79.
[64] For example: Matthew (23:1-5) and Justin (Dialogues ch.46).
Admittedly, it would be tempting to read the Christian attack on the injunction
against wearing mixed species as a roundabout allusion both to the idea found
in the first century CE Pauline Epistle to the Romans – that the
gentiles are validated as tree grafts [forbidden by Jewish law (m. Kilayim
1:4,7; t. Kilayim 1:10)] onto the original olive tree of Israel from which the
unbelieving Jews are being lopped off [Romans 11:16-25 cf. 10:19-21]), and to
the late first-century CE Ephesians (2:15) idea that Jesus mixes the species of
that are separated by a mehitza [cf. m. Kilayim 4:3-4; t. Kilayim ch.4],
i.e. the mixed species of gentiles and Jews [see Derekh Eretz, Arayot
#11; cf. Jubilees ch.30]). However, we
are now seeing that a more accurate explanation of the subject of this attack,
one that would be in line with the Christian critiques of the three laws
discussed above, is the actual norm of wearing mixed species.
[The rabbis countered the Christian claim of Gentile connection to
Abraham (Galatians 3:29 through Tertullian, De Momogamia ch.6) in other
ways, such as by claiming that God acquired the people of Israel
(Mekhilta, Beshalah – Parsha 9) and by claiming that the patriarch Jacob
survives along with the seed of Jacob (R. Yitzhak, a third century CE
Eretz-Israel Amora [b. Ta’anit 5b]).]
[65] This anti tassels position is glossed over by Fine (2013, 25) who
refers to Shaye Cohen but ignores the fact that Cohen does cite some sources
about some Jews having a distinctive dress of tassels (Cohen 1999, 33-34).
As for why phylacteries are not found in this list: although Matthew
(23:1-5) and Justin (Dialogues ch.46) condemned both tzitzit and phylacteries
as “overly” pious, phylacteries would not have been a defensive point of debate
with Christians. Not only did
Christians continue to wear Biblical-text amulets (Skemer 2006, 35-36 and n.46)
but Tannaim also maintained the Second-Temple norm of painting tefillin in
simple black* and condemned anyone who wore expensive gold painted tefillin
as a superficial show off (m. Megilla 4:8).
Amoraim stated even more forcefully that Judaism had always invalidated tefillin
painted in any but the cheap color black (y. Megilllah 4:9).
Furthermore, a dominant Tannaim and Amoraic position forbade wearing the
head-tefillin outdoors (m. Shabbat 6:2 – when the whole chapter is read in its
original not Shabbat-specific context of proper and improper outdoor dress for
men and for women) – although, outstanding individuals were allowed to and
respected for wearing tefillin everywhere (b. Taanit 20b; baraita b. Sukka
29a). At the very least, wearing
tefillin was opposed on the days of public rest and mingling – Sabbaths and
holidays (Mekhilta, Bo parsha 17; Mekhilta de-Rashbi 13:10; y. Berakhot 2:3 =
y. Eruvin 10:1; and b. Menahot 36b). [However, here too, some rabbis did wear
tefillin even on these days – y. Berakhot 2:3 = y. Eruvin 10:1.]
* For black tefillin boxes at
Qumran, see Schiffman 1994b, 306-307 (and internet sites such as slides 23-25
at University of Pennsylvania’s
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~jtigay/nelc150slides).
[66] “[The wearing of] mixed fibers from: “Do not wear adulterated, [wool
and linen together]” (Deuteronomy 22:11). [Yet] a linen garment with tzitzit
[blue woolen fringes] is permitted?!” (Pesikta de-Rav Kahana, 4; and
parallels).
In truth: some
Tannaim forbade wearing Tyrian blue tzitzit on linen graments. They thus forbade wearing linen cloaks (m. Eduyot 4:10; Midrash Tannaim on Deuteronomy 22:12; Masekhet Tzitzit
1:2; baraita b. Berkahot 54b; baraita b. Nidda 70b; and compare the y.
Sanhedrin 2:8 tradition that some Tannaim looked askance at a man who wore even
plain linen cloaks). However,
Christian opponents would not have been interested in discussing or even
noticing the “consistent” (albeit extreme) position.
[67] Numbers 16:1-50. For our
purposes, we have no need to discuss whether this is one story or multiple
stories.
[68] Numbers 16:1-4, 12-14, 21-34.
[69] Numbers 16:3.
[70] Numbers 16:5-11, 15-19, 35.
[71] Cf. Josephus Antiquities of the Jews (chapter 4) with Plato’s Republic
(Books 8-9), and see other sources in Feldman (1998, 389-391).
[72] For example: see Reinhold 2002, 30.
[73] Regarding private libraries in Roman society see Feldman 1996,
220. For archeological evidence on
private libraries in Eretz-Israel Jewish society see Popović 2012, 567-570,
573-576.
[74] The rabbis preferred public study houses and such privately owned study
structures as were made accessible to the public (Hezser 1997, 200-213) –
similar to the archeologically discovered privately owned synagogues made
accessible to the public (Foerster 1992, 300-301; Schwartz 2001, 233-234)
[comparable to the early Christian domus ecclesia].
[75] Reinhold 1971, 275-302.
[76] Cf. Luke 16:19-26.
A different, imposed, interpretation of this midrash was offered by Rav
Soloveitchik (2005, 21-22) who overlooked the historical and even
Biblical-narrative context of the Midrash in keeping with the fact that the
“the Brisker constructs his legal world to emphasize that halakha stands
outside of time and space” (Saiman 2005, 83; cf. Rosensweig 2005, 118; et
al). Due to the surprisingly similar
widespread academic consensus to engage in the history of abstract ideas and
laws as if ideas and laws must first be defined independently of context,
Christine Hayes reached the same imposed reading (Hayes 2011, 134).
[77] m. Kilayim 9:2.
[78] A similar designation of these Jews as fools or wicked may exist in a
famous Eretz-Israel sermonic text, the Passover-Haggadah/Talmud-Yeushalmi
discussion of the wicked/foolish son – if that text was, indeed, a response to
Christian ideology (as argued by Yuval 1999, 107).
